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Abstract—The increasing penetration of renewable energy in
recent years has led to more uncertainties in power systems.
In order to maintain system reliability and security, electricity
market operators need to keep certain reserves in the Security-
Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) problems. A new con-
cept, deliverable generation ramping reserve, is proposed in
this paper. The prices of generation ramping reserves and
generation capacity reserves are derived in the Affine Adjustable
Robust Optimization framework. With the help of these prices,
the valuable reserves can be identified among the available
reserves. These prices provide crucial information on the values
of reserve resources, which are critical for the long-term flexibility
investment. The market equilibrium based on these prices is
analyzed. Simulations on a 3-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus
system are performed to illustrate the concept of ramping reserve
price and capacity reserve price. The impacts of the reserve credit
on market participants are discussed.
Index Terms—Ramping Reserve, Capacity Reserve, Marginal
Price, Uncertainties, Affinely Adjustable Robust Optimization
NOMENCLATURE
Indices
i, k, l, t index for unit, uncertainty, line, and time
m,n index for bus
Functions and sets
E(·) expectation function
Tr(·), (·)>, (·)j· trace, transpose, jth row of a matrix
Λ(·) cost as a function of adjustment matrix
Φ(·) Lagrangian function
(·)∗ optimal value of a variable
G(m) set of units located at bus m
Constants
ND, NG, NKnumber of buses, units and uncertainty con-
straints
NL, NT number of lines and time intervals
qi, bi cost coefficients for unit i
Qi Qi = qiINT ∈ RNT×NT , INT is unity matrix
Bi Bi = [bi · · · bi]> ∈ RNT
fi cost related to unit commitment decision
dm,t,d aggregated equivalent load demand on bus m
at t, d = [d1,t · · · dND,1 · · · dND,NT ]>
F¯l,F branch flow limit, abstract vector F ∈
R2NLNT
Γl,m shift factor for line l and bus m
Pmini , P
max
i minimum and maximum generation outputs
Iˆi,t, yˆi,t, zˆi,t unit on/off, start-up and shutdown indicators
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RUi , R
D
i unit ramping up/down limits
D time-load incidence matrix, D ∈ RNT×NDNT
A,Ri abstract matrix and vector for (1-3), A ∈
R4NT×NT , Ri ∈ R4NT .
Γi,Γd abstract shift factor matrix for unit i and load
S, h polyhedron uncertainty set matrix and vector
Variables
Gi generation adjustment matrix, Gi ∈ RNT×NDNT
pi Prices. piei is the energy LMP for unit i, pi
e
i ∈
RNT ; piri is the reserve price vector for unit i,
piri ∈ R4NT ; piai is the marginal price for affine
adjustment, piai ∈ RNT×NDNT .
Pi,t generation output, Pi,t ∈ R
Pi generation vector, Pi = [Pi,1 · · ·Pi,NT ]> ∈ RNT
Pˆ i generation re-dispatch vector, Pˆi ∈ RNT
Qrui,t , Q
rd
i,t generation ramping reserve, Q
ru
i,t ∈ R, Qrdi,t ∈ R
Qcui,t, Q
cd
i,t generation capacity reserve, Q
cu
i,t ∈ R, Qcdi,t ∈ R
 uncertainty vector,  ∈ RNT×ND
λ, αi, η Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (15, 17,
19)
γ, βi, τ Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (16,18,20)
Θi credits to uncertainty mitigators i
I. INTRODUCTION
THE renewable energy sources (RES), such as wind powergeneration, and price-sensitive demand response (DR)
have attracted a lot of attentions recently. The total installed
capacity of wind power in the U.S. reached 47 GW at the
end of 2011 [1]. Several ISOs/RTOs, such as PJM, ISO New
England, NYISO, and CAISO have initiated DR programs in
their markets [2]. The essential objective to use renewable
energy and initiate DR programs in electricity markets is
to maximize the total social warfare as well as to protect
the environment. However, they also pose new challenges
to the system operators in electricity markets. Due to its
intrinsic characteristics, the amount of available renewable
energy is sometimes hard to predict. For instance, large-scale
wind production varies from -20% to 20% of the installed
wind capacity in Denmark on an hourly basis [3]. Prediction
error for wind farms aggregated output by existing state-of-art
method may fall into a range of 5%-20% of the total installed
capacity [4]. In the meantime, the amount of un-predictable
loads also increases in the wholesale market as the forecasting
of price-sensitive loads relies on the forecasted price as input,
which itself has significant error.
Surviving uncertainties is fundamentally important for the
reliable and secure operation of a power system. If the system
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2with pre-planned schedule cannot accommodate the deviation
of the wind power and load from their forecasted values, the
system operator may have to curtail wind energy or shed load
in the real-time market (RTM). In order to keep a certain
level of reliability or security, the ISO/RTO has to increase the
ramping capability of the system to compensate the variations
of wind energy and load in a short time [5], [6]. More efficient
and reliable methods are required to determine the optimal
reserves when the uncertainty level is high. Recently stochastic
and robust approaches have been successfully applied by
researchers to address the issues related to uncertainties in
electricity markets. At the same time, market designers are
also seeking effective market mechanism to address the un-
certainty issues. For instance, intraday market (IDM) is now
established between day-ahead market (DAM) and RTM in
European countries since uncertainties on the intraday level
are significantly smaller compared to those on the day-ahead
level [7]. In the U.S., hour-ahead scheduling process (HASP)
is employed by the California ISO [8].
Typical approaches to solving stochastic SCUC are sce-
nario based [9], [10]. The basic idea is to generate enough
samples for uncertain parameters with an assumption that
their probability distribution function (PDF) is known. Those
samples are then modeled in a Mixed Integer Linear/Quadratic
Programming (MILP/MIQP) problem. The two main draw-
backs of the scenario-based approaches are that the PDF
is hard to obtain in some circumstances, and uncertainty
accommodation is not guaranteed. In fact, the MILP/MIQP
problem becomes intractable when the sample size is large.
Comparing with stochastic optimization, two largest merits of
robust optimization are that the solution can be immunized
against all uncertainties and PDF is not required. In [11], [12],
robust SCUC problem is solved in two stages. The first stage
is to determine the unit commitment (UC) solution which is
immunized against the worst case with the lowest cost. In the
second stage, a feasible solution to SCED is obtained. Affinely
adjustable robust optimization (AARO) models are proposed
recently [13]–[15]. They employ an affine function to adjust
the generation output following the load deviation. Recently,
we propose an economic-efficient robust SCUC model with a
fast solution approach [16].
Although applying robust techniques in SCUC/SCED re-
ceives a lot of attentions from researchers, it still remains a
big challenge on how to credit the flexibilities in the U.S. elec-
tricity markets. In the existing Ancillary Service (AS) Market,
the reserves are determined in advance [17]. The amount of
required reserves is generally extracted from larger number
of Monte Carlo simulations for the contingencies [18]. With
the help of the AARO, those reserves are determined in one
shot based on uncertainty information. Then a critical issue is
how to price those reserves when there are no explicit reserve
requirement constraints. On the other hand, some reserves are
free byproducts in the co-optimization approach [17]. They are
kept because the market participants want to get the energy
profits. Moreover, some reserves are scarce resources due to
their deliverability. These observations indicate that not all the
available reserves in the system are valuable from the system
operator’s point of view.
In many countries, electricity markets are still evolving with
the challenges of uncertain energy resource and load [19].
The ramping products are proposed by California ISO [20] to
accommodate the uncertainties. It should be emphasized that
the bus-level delivery is not considered for ramping capacity
in [20]. Before applying the robust optimization SCED in the
real market, the corresponding pricing theory is imperative.
This paper tries to propose some new ideas to clear this
obstacle. The three major contributions of this paper are listed
as follows.
1) A new concept, deliverable generation ramping reserve,
is proposed within the AARO SCED framework. The
generation ramping reserve is the additional ramping
capability of the generator when part of it is “locked”
in the SCED schedule.
2) The prices for the generation ramping reserves as well
generation capacity reserves are derived within the ro-
bust co-optimization framework. With the help of the
price information, the valuable reserves can be easily
identified among the available reserves.
3) The market equilibrium is characterized by the proposed
prices and dispatch instructions. The market participants
can get the maximal profit by following ISO’s the
dispatch instruction and price signals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The derivation
of the reserve prices is presented in Section II based on AARO
SCED, and then the market mechanism to credit flexibilities is
discussed. Case studies for 3-Bus and IEEE 118-Bus systems
are presented in Section III. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. AARO SCED AND PRICES
In electricity markets, RTOs/ISOs normally operate two
markets including DAM and RTM (or balancing market) [21].
The majority of the trades is cleared in DAM via SCUC [21],
and SCED is normally performed periodically in RTM. This
paper mainly focuses on the RTM.
In standard SCED problem, the unit generation output is
subject to the following constraints which include unit capacity
limits (1) and unit ramping up/down limits (2) (3).
Iˆi,tP
min
i ≤ Pi,t ≤ Iˆi,tPmaxi ,∀i, t (1)
Pi,t − Pi,(t−1) ≤ RUi (1− yˆi,t) + Pmini yˆi,t,∀i, t (2)
−Pi,t + Pi,(t−1) ≤ RDi (1− zˆi,t) + Pmini zˆi,t,∀i, t (3)
Equations (2) and (3) show that a unit has to operate at its
minimum capacity in two cases: right after it is turned on or
right before it is turned off, which implies that the unit cannot
provide reserve in those two cases. For notation brevity, we
use matrix and vector to replace the formulations above. Then
the SCED problem can be formulated as
min
P i
∑
i
P>i QiPi +B
>
i Pi + fi (4)
s.t. (λ)
∑
i
Pi = Dd, (5)
(αi ≥ 0) APi ≤ Ri,∀i (6)
(η ≥ 0)
∑
i
ΓiPi − Γdd ≤ F , (7)
3where (4) stands the operation cost. (5) denotes the load
balance constraints. (6) is the compact form of (1)-(3). (7)
represent the transmission constraints. Γi ∈ R2NLNT×NT , and
Γd ∈ R2NLNT×NDNT .
Due to the forecasting errors of renewable power output
and load, ISOs/RTOs need to run SCED on a rolling basis in
real time to balance the system. Recently, some approaches
have been successfully applied in the SCUC/SCED problem
to address the uncertainty issues caused by variations of
load and renewables. Both stochastic SCUC/SCED and robust
SCUC/SCED are studied intensively when considering the
uncertainties.
To our best knowledge, this paper represents the first work
on pricing the reserves in robust optimization framework.
Hence, the following assumptions are made so that we can
focus on the concept.
• Transmission loss is ignored in the SCED problem.
• The proposed approach is for ex ante dispatch and ex ante
pricing. It is assumed that units are dispatched according
to these instructions during the scheduling intervals.
• Units bid only energy price. The reserve bid is zero.
• Uncertainty comes from loads. Renewables are treated as
negative loads. Other uncertainties such as contingencies
are not discussed in this paper.
• Uncertainty set information is available to the ISO/RTO.
• Expectation and covariance of uncertainties can be ob-
tained from historical data. However, PDF information is
not specified for uncertainty as it is hard to obtain for
uncertain sources such as RES.
A. Affinely Adjustable Robust SCED
The basic idea of AARO optimization is originally from
paper [15], in which a linear “feedback” in control theory is
used to adjust dispatch with the realization of load. Authors
in [13], [14], [22] applied it to solve SCED problem. In this
section, the generation output is affinely adjusted according to
the uncertainties,
Pˆi = Pi +Gi,∀i, (8)
where Gi ∈ RNT×NDNT is the affine adjustment matrix.
Pi ∈ RNT and Pˆi ∈ RNT are base dispatch and adjusted
dispatch respectively, and  ∈ RNDNT is the uncertainty vector
(i.e., deviation of loads from forecasted values). The new unit
dispatch can be regulated based on the load deviation. It is
noted that  ∈ U , and
U := { : S ≤ h}, (9)
where S ∈ RNK×NDNT and h ∈ RNK . U is a polyhedron
which includes more than just the lower and upper bounds
for uncertainty. It is noted that entry in h is considered as
uncertainty level which is positive. The AARO SCED, denoted
as (ROP), can be formulated as
(ROP) : min
Pi,Gi
∑
i
E
[
Pˆ>i QiPˆi +B
>
i Pˆi + fi
]
(10)
s.t.
∑
i
Pˆi = D(d+ ),∀ ∈ U (11)
APˆi ≤ Ri,∀i,∀ ∈ U (12)∑
i
ΓiPˆi − Γd(d+ ) ≤ F ,∀ ∈ U (13)
(8),
where Qi is a semi-definite matrix with only diagonal entry.
The objective function (10) is to minimize the expected cost.
Without loss of generality, assume E() = 0. The objective
function (10) can be rewritten as∑
i
(
P>i QiPi +B
>
i Pi + Λ(Gi)
)
,
where Λ(Gi) = Tr[G>i QiGiE(
>)]+fi. It is assumed that
covariance matrix E(>) is available, but PDF is unavailable.
The problem (ROP) is converted to a computationally tractable
problem (P) as follows, where the constraints including uncer-
tain parameters are exactly reformulated.
(P) : min
Pi,Gi,ρi,ζ
∑
i
(
P>i QiPi +B
>
i Pi + Λ(Gi)
)
(14)
s.t. (λ)
∑
i
Pi = Dd (15)
(γ)
∑
i
Gi = D (16)
(αi ≥ 0) −Ri +APi + ρ>i h ≤ 0,∀i (17)
(βi) AGi − ρ>i S = 0,∀i (18)
(η ≥ 0) −F − Γdd+
∑
i
ΓiPi + ζ
>h ≤ 0(19)
(τ )
∑
i
ΓiGi − Γd − ζ>S = 0 (20)
ρi ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0,
where ρi> ∈ R4NT×NK and ζ> ∈ R2NLNT×NK are also
variables. (15) and (16) are derived from (8) and (11). (17)-
(20) are obtained from strong duality. Problem (P) is convex
and can be solved efficiently by commercial solvers such
as CPLEX and GUROBI. It can be observed that no PDF
information is required to solve (P).
Different from the standard SCED (4)-(7), extra terms ρ>i h
and ζ>h are added in inequality constraints (17) and (19),
respectively, in problem (P). As ρ>i ≥ 0, ζ> ≥ 0 and h ≥ 0,
ρ>i h and ζ
>h are non-negative. It indicates that certain unit
and transmission constraints in standard SCED are replaced
with stronger constraints in the robust framework. Thus,
the system actually keeps certain flexibilities for uncertainty
accommodation. In the following sections, we will analyze
these flexibilities, which are also called reserves.
B. Generation Ramping Reserve and Capacity Reserve
An Uncertainty Mitigator (UM) refers to a flexible resource
provider that participates in the management of uncertainties.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of Upward Ramping Reserve (LR: Locked Ramping, RR:
Ramping Reserve)
The flexible resources include generators with available ramp-
ing capabilities and adjustable loads. UMs have to keep certain
reserves in order to accommodate the uncertainties. Compared
to (6), constraint (17) may be binding even when the scheduled
dispatch does not reach the capacity limits (1) or ramping
limits (2)-(3). Based on the optimal solution to (P), the reserves
can be calculated.
The generation ramping reserve is defined as the unused
unit ramping capability or the value of the slack variable for
(2-3), i.e.
Qrui,t := R
U
i (1− yˆi,t) +
Pmini yˆi,t −
(
P ∗i,t − P ∗i,(t−1)
)
t− (t− 1) ,∀i, t,
(21)
Qrdi,t := R
D
i (1− zˆi,t) +
Pmini zˆi,t −
(
P ∗i,(t−1) − P ∗i,t
)
t− (t− 1) ,∀i, t,
(22)
where Qrui,t and Q
rd
i,t are the upward and downward ramping
reserves, respectively. Fig. 1 illustrate the concept of the
upward ramping reserve. With scheduled generation outputs
at t and t + 1, the locked ramping or the used unit ramping
capability is (Pi,t+1−Pi,t)/1. The generation ramping reserve
is the available ramping rate less the locked ramping. The
ramping reserve guarantees that the uncertainty mitigator still
has additional ramping capability during the scheduled ramp-
ing process. In the existing AS market, the “locked” ramping
is normally ignored for the spinning reserves [23], [24]. In
the RTM, the time resolution is 5 minutes or 15 minutes, if
we ignore the ramping process, there is a chance that system
cannot provide enough ramping capability to accommodate
the uncertainties. In contrast, the time resolution is one hour
in DAM, and the units have enough time to redispatch even
if the locked ramping is ignored [17], [23].
The generation capacity reserve is defined as unused unit
generation capacity or the constraint slack for (1), i.e.
Qcui,t := Iˆi,tP
max
i − P ∗i,t, (23)
Qcdi,t := P
∗
i,t − Iˆi,tPmini ,∀i, t (24)
where Qcdi,t and Q
cu
i,t are the lower and upper generation
capacity reserves, respectively. From the system’s point of
view, the total capacity reserves are fixed when the unit
commitment and load level are determined.
C. Marginal Prices
In most generation and reserve co-optimization approaches
in AS market, the explicit reserve requirement constraint is
modeled [17], [18], [25]. The shadow prices of this type
of constraint is employed to derive the reserve price which
reflects the coupled effects of the generation and reserve.
Instead of setting the reserve manually and heuristically based
on Monte Carlo simulations, the reserves in the AARO SCED
are determined automatically in one shot. Although it has
obvious advantages over the traditional reserve determination,
it also poses new challenges on reserve price derivation. The
existing pricing approaches cannot be used directly [17], [18]
due to the lack of explicit reserve requirement constraints.
While the amount of reserves can be calculated according
to (21)-(24), the question is how to set the prices for them.
On the one hand, it is well known that not all the reserves
are deliverable for uncertainty accommodation due to network
constraints. On the other hand, the generation and reserve are
coupled together in the RTM even if the reserve bid price
is zero [26], and the market clearing price for reserve has
certain relations with that for energy. In this paper, we call
the reserve obtained by (21)-(24) available reserve. If a small
increment or decrement of the reserve amount causes change
of the expected operation cost in (P), then this type of reserve
is called valuable reserve. To determine the exact value a
reserve has, we derive the marginal prices for the reserve
according to the Lagrangian function as follows.
The Lagrangian function for (P) is
Φ(Pi, Gi, ρi, ζ, λ, γ, αi, βi, η, τ ) (25)
=
∑
i
(
P>i QiPi +B
>
i Pi + Λ(Gi)
)
+ λ>
(
Dd−
∑
i
Pi
)
+ Tr[γ>(D −
∑
i
Gi)]
+
∑
i
(
α>i (APi + ρ
>
i h−Ri) + Tr[β>i (AGi − ρ>i S)]
)
+ η>
(− F − Γdd+∑
i
ΓiPi + ζ
>h
)
+ Tr[τ>
(∑
i
ΓiGi − Γd − ζ>S
)
]
The ramping reserve price for UM i is defined as the marginal
expected cost due to a unit decrement of the generation
ramping rate of UM i. The capacity reserve price for UM i is
defined as the marginal expected cost due to a unit decrement
of the generation capacity of UM i. They can be obtained from
the Lagrangian function as
piri = −
∂Φ
∂Ri
= α∗i . (26)
Hence, the reserve provided by i is valuable only when piri is
non-zero. Note that α∗i consists of Lagrangian multipliers for
unit ramping limits and unit capacity limits.
The LMP for AARO SCED can be obtained based on
its definition. It is the marginal expected cost due to a unit
increment of the load. For generator i, it is formulated as
piei = λ
∗ − Γ>i η∗, (27)
5where piei ∈ RNT . piei also consists of energy component and
congestion component. As shown in [13], the affine adjustment
price can be obtained as
piai = γ
∗ − Γ>i τ∗ −A>β∗i , (28)
piai ∈ RNT×NDNT represents the marginal value of the
adjustment coefficient in Gi. As stated in [13], Tr[G>i pi
a
i]
is the payment to i. It is noted that the unit of piai is $ as Gi
is participant factor.
D. Credit to Uncertainty Mitigators
Within the AARO framework, UMs help the system with-
stand the “load deviation” in the future. As the generation and
the reserve are coupled together, the credit to reserve should
reflect the coupling effect. Only the UMs who provide the
valuable reserves are entitled to credits.
The price of the flexible resources are piri for UM i. The
total credit allocated to i is
Θi =
(
Ri −AP ∗i
)>
piri, (29)
which is the product of the reserve price and the reserve
amount. In fact, the reserve price piri reflects how much “value”
the reserve has. Ri −AP ∗i reflects the available reserve,
which is the reserve quantity at each time interval. Only when
the reserve is a valuable reserve (i.e. piri 6= 0), UM i get the
reserve credit. Otherwise, the credit entitled to UM i is zero
even if the available reserve it provides is non-zero. There
are similar phenomenons in the traditional zonal-based reserve
market. For example, the reserve price $0/MWh at a specific
zone occurs when the cleared system reserve is higher than
the required amount in Case I of Section VI [17].
E. Market Equilibrium
In the partial market equilibrium model, it is assumed that
market participants are price takers [27]. This assumption is
popular in the electricity market [25], [28]. The expected profit
maximization problem for source i can be formulated as
(PMPi) : max
Pi,Gi
E
{
Pi
>piei + Tr[G
>
i pi
a
i]−B>i (Pi +Gi)
−(Pi +Gi)>Qi(Pi +Gi)− fi + Θi
}
s.t. (8)(12)
where the decision variables for source i are Pi and Gi,
given the price signal piei,pi
a
i, and pi
r
i. Credit Tr[G
>
i pi
a
i] is
for the affine adjustment matrix as stated in [13]. It should
be noted that the constraint for mitigator i is (12), which is
why incentive Θi is necessary for i to follow the dispatch
instruction. The objective function can be converted to
P>i pi
e
i + Tr[G
>
i pi
a
i] + (Ri −APi)>piri
−P>i QPi −B>i Pi − fi − Tr
[
G>i QiGiE(
>)
] (30)
It can be observed that (30) is a portion of the Lagrangian
function (25). The optimal solution (Pi, Gi) to (PMPi) is a
function of (piei,pi
a
i,pi
r
i). Since the problem (P) is convex and
Slater’s condition is satisfied, the strong duality holds. There-
fore, the saddle point (P ∗i , G
∗
i ), which is the optimal solution
to (P), is also the optimal solution to (PMPi). Consequently,
source i can obtain the maximum profit by following the ISO’s
dispatch instruction (P ∗i , G
∗
i ). If the objective function (14) is
strictly convex, then (P ∗i , G
∗
i ) is the unique choice for i to get
the maximal profit. Price signal piri (associated with credit Θi)
and piei provide the incentives for i to dispatch power output
to P ∗i , which supplies the load and maintains the ramping and
capacity reserves. In addition, the price signal piai provides the
incentive for i to follow the adjustment instruction Gi.
Given that the optimality condition of problem (P) is satis-
fied, dispatch signal (P ∗i , G
∗
i ) and price signal (pi
e
i, pi
a
i, α
∗
i )
constitute a competitive partial equilibrium [27]. The as-
sumption made for the equilibrium model is that the market
participant uses affine policy to adjust the generation, so the
dispatch obtained from AARO SCED is near-optimal solution.
Consequently, the equilibrium conditions are also near-optimal
for market participants.
An alternative way to get the partial market equilibrium is
to lump the reserve price into the LMP. However, it has serious
incentive issues. The integrated LMP can be written as
pˆiei = λ
∗ − Γ>i η∗ −A>αi. (31)
The new credit UM i receives on the energy and reserve is
(pˆiei )
>Pi = (piei)
>Pi − (αi)>APi. (32)
It can be observed that the reserve credit is negative when
the shadow price of the upper bound constraint is nonzero.
It means that the more flexible resources UM provides, the
fewer profit it gets. The UM is provided negative incentives
for the flexible resources. In contrast, the reserve credit defined
in (29) is always nonnegative.
III. CASE STUDY
A 3-Bus system and the modified IEEE 118-bus system
are studied in this section to illustrate the concepts of avail-
able/valuable ramping/capacity reserves and the associated
prices, as well as their impacts on market participants. The
simulations are carried out by CPLEX 12.5 on PC with Intel
i7-3770 3.40GHZ 8GB RAM.
A. 3-Bus System
The 3-Bus system is consisted of two units, one wind farm,
two loads, and three lines. Please refer http://motor.ece.iit.edu/
data/rscuc/3 bus data.pdf for the detailed data. For simplicity,
three time intervals are studied and a single-segment incre-
mental cost (IC) is employed to represent the fuel cost. The
time resolution is 15 minutes. It is assumed that both units in
the system are committed, which is determined in the DAM.
Load in the current interval (i.e., Time 1) is assumed to be
accurate. Loads from Time 2 and Time 3 are forecasted based
on current available information, and forecasting errors may
exist. Assume that the expectation of uncertainties at Time 2
and Time 3 are 0, and their probability distribution is unknown.
The total expected cost calculated based on the AARO
SCED is $1380.9. It is higher than the standard SCED cost
$1333.5, which cannot be immuned against uncertainties. It
indicates that the expensive G2 supplies more loads within
AARO SCED than it does in standard SCED. The reason
6TABLE I
BASE ED AND LMP FOR 3-BUS SYSTEM IN CASE 2
Time G1 (MW) G2 (MW) LMP ($/MWh)Bus1 Bus2 Bus3
1 126.5 13.5 10 10 10
2 131.65 23.35 10 32.5 23.5
3 143.6 23.4 10 32.5 23.5
TABLE II
UPWARD RESERVES AND PRICES FOR 3-BUS SYSTEM IN CASE 2
Time G1 G2
RR RRP CR CRP RR RRP CR CRP
1 18.5 0 53.5 0 6.5 0 66.5 0
2 19.85 0 48.35 0 0.15 15 56.65 0
3 13.05 0 36.4 0 9.95 7.5 56.6 0
RR: Ramping Reserve, MW/15min; RRP: Ramping Reserve Price, $/(MWh/15min)
CR: Capacity Reserve, MW; CRP: Capacity Reserve Price, $/MWh
TABLE III
CREDITS ENTITLED TO UNITS BASED ON RESERVE PRICES IN CASE 2 ($)
Time G1 G2
1 0 0
2 0 15*0.15*0.25=0.5625
3 0 7.5*9.95*0.25=18.6563
of dispatching the extra generation from G2 is that operator
needs additional deliverable reserves to accommodate the
uncertainties while minimizing the total cost. The non-zero
entries in G1 ∈ R3×6 are g111 = g212 = 1, g123 = 1, g124 =
0.98, g136 = 0.4, and the non-zero entries in G2 ∈ R3×6 are
g224 = 0.02, g
2
35 = 1, g
2
36 = 0.6. If the loads on bus 1 and bus 3
at interval 2 are increased to 97MW and 67.5MW, respectively,
then the units can be re-dispatched based on the adjustment
matrix to 131.65 + 1 × 7 + 0.98 × 2.5 = 141.025MW and
23.35 + 0× 7 + 0.02× 2.5 = 23.475MW.
The question is whether the units have incentives to main-
tain the reserves. First, we consider the scenario without
reserve credits. The LMP at bus 2 at Time 2 of $32.5/MWh is
larger than G2’s marginal cost of $10/MWh. Therefore, G2 is
inclined to supply more loads at Time 2. The increase of the
output from G2 will shrink the reserve it can provide. The fact
that G2 has negative profit at Time 1 is the uplift issue [29],
which is beyond the scope of this paper. In this scenario, the
market participants would ignore the uncertainties and game
the market.
Now, we consider the second scenario with reserve credits.
The upward reserves provided by UMs are shown in Table II.
It is observed that the capacity reserve is not scarce resource,
i.e. the online capacity is adequate. They are just available
reserves. In contrast, the prices of upward ramping reserve at
Time 2 and Time 3 are non-zeros. According to the definition
in this paper, they are valuable reserves. In this scenario,
UMs are entitled certain credits based on the contribution. As
shown in Table III, uncertainty mitigator G2 is entitled $0.56
at Time 2 and $18.66 at Time 3, where $15/(MWh/15min)
and $7.5/(MWh/15min) are the entries in pir2 for ramping
constraints at Time 2 and Time 3, respectively; and 0.15
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Fig. 2. System-wide Net Load
MW/15min and 9.95 MW/15min are the ramping reserves of
G2 at Times 2 and 3, respectively. The credit is calculated
based on (29). It is noted that the credits are time-coupled, as
the ramping reserve is calculated according to the difference
of the power outputs between two intervals.
Next we give an example to show whether G2 is inclined
to deviate from the base dispatch instruction with the credits
from LMPs and piri. If G2 follows the instruction P
∗
2 as shown
in Table I, then the total credit associated with LMPs and
piri are [13.5, 23.35, 23.4] · [10, 32.5, 32.5]> · 0.25 + 0.5625 +
18.6563 = $432.8125. Consider a possible base dispatch
[12.5, 22.35, 23.4], where G2 generates 1MW less at Time 1 as
its profit is negative at Time 1, and it also generates 1MW less
at Time 2 to maintain the same ramping reserve. Then the new
credit is [12.5, 22.35, 23.4] · [10, 32.5, 32.5]> ·0.25 + 0.5625 +
7.5 ·8.95 ·0.25 = $420.3125, where ramping reserve at Time 3
is decreased to 8.95MW/15min. The credit is $12.5 lower than
that by following P ∗2 , and the saved fuel cost by supplying
smaller load is 2 · 25 · 0.25 = $12.5. Therefore, G2 does not
get more profit by using this dispatch. This example illustrates
how G2 gets credit associated with LMPs and piri, and why
G2 is not inclined to deviate the dispatch instruction P ∗2 . The
more rigorous mathematical analysis on market equilibrium is
shown in Section II-E.
B. Modified IEEE 118-Bus System
There are 54 traditional units and 186 branches in the
modified IEEE 118-Bus system. The scheduling period is 2
hours, and the time interval is 15 minutes. The loads are
depicted in Fig. 2. The UCs are determined in advance by
the solution to robust SCUC problem with 5% reserves. Five
wind farms are introduced in the system, and they are located
at buses 11, 49, 60, 78, and 90, respectively. We denote the
set of buses with uncertainty as M. It is assumed that the
forecasted power output (i.e. nominal output) and installed
capacity for each wind farm are 100 MW and 200 MW,
respectively. The uncertainties in this case are from the RES
only. The uncertainty m,t satisfies|m,t| ≤ 100 · r1
(
1 + 0.01 · (t− 1)
)
,m ∈M,∀t∣∣∣∑m m,t∣∣∣ ≤ 500 · r1 · r2(1 + 0.01 · (t− 1)),m ∈M,∀t
where r1 reflects the forecast error confidence interval for a
single wind farm [4], [14], and r2 reflects the forecast error
confidence interval for the aggregated wind output. When r2 <
1, it indicates that the aggregated forecast error confidence
interval is smaller than the sum of five single intervals. In the
experiment, the forecast error increases with the time intervals.
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Fig. 3. Total Reserve Credit W.R.T. Uncertainty Levels and Fixed Nominal
Wind Power (r2 = 1)
The detailed data including unit parameters, uncertainty corre-
lation matrix, line reactance and ratings, and net load profiles
can be found at http://motor.ece.iit.edu/Data/118 UMP.xls.
We consider the interval bounds for the uncertainties, and
perform the sensitivity analysis with respect to r1. Fig. 3 shows
the reserve credits (RC) the UMs receive with the change of
the r1. The reserve credit (RC) is the sum of the ramping
reserve credit and capacity reserve credit UMs are entitled to.
When r1 is high, the UMs are also entitled to high credits. As
shown in (29), the reserve credits are the sum of the products
of the amount of valuable reserve and the price of the valuable
reserve. They are analyzed as follows.
Table IV presents the upward/downward available reserves
and valuable reserves at Time 2 with increasing forecast errors,
fixed normal wind power output (100MW each), and fixed
r2. The r1 ∈ [0.1, 0.7], so the error in percentage of the
installed capacity (200MW each) is from 5% to 35%. It is
observed that the available reserves remain the same while
valuable reserve change dramatically with the forecast errors.
As shown in Table IV, upward available ramping reserve
remains 886.70MW/15min, and the capacity reserve remains
661.43MW. The main reason is that the unit commitment and
load demand is fixed at Time 2 in the system. In contrast, the
upward valuable reserve is 0 when r1 = 0.1. It indicates that
the opportunity cost of keeping the ramping reserve for UM is
zero as it can recover the profit from the energy credit. When
r1 is 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4, the valuable ramping reserve is around
180MW/15min, and the valuable capacity reserve is around
11MW, 61MW, and 112MW respectively. UMs are entitled to
credits by keeping the reserves, which is also shown in Fig. 3.
It suggests that opportunity cost of keeping the reserve is non-
zero, i.e., UMs can get more profits by deviating from the
dispatch instruction if they are not entitled to reserve credits.
When r1 is further increased to 0.5, the amount of valuable
ramping reserve jumps to 479MW/15min. It means that more
available reserves become valuable when the uncertainty level
is high. The valuable capacity reserve also increases to 163
MW in this case. A similar tendency can also be observed
for the downward reserves shown in Table IV. It should be
emphasized that the amount of valuable reserve doesn’t change
monotonically with the uncertainty level. Instead, what we
revealed in this paper is a trend.
The upward available ramping reserve and the price of unit
42 are depicted for different time intervals in Fig. 4 with
r1 = 0.7, r2 = 1. As shown in Fig. 4, at Time 7, the unit
only provides available reserve but not valuable reserve as its
TABLE IV
RESERVES W.R.T INCREASING UNCERTAINTY LEVELS AND FIXED
NOMINAL WIND POWER (r2 = 1, t = 2)
r1
Upward Reserve Downward Reserve
AvaRamp ValRamp AvaCap ValCap AvaRamp ValRamp AvaCap ValCap
0.1 886.79 0 661.43 0 938.46 0 4203.57 0
0.2 886.79 180.79 661.43 10.61 938.46 10.37 4203.57 0
0.3 886.79 180.29 661.43 61.36 938.46 0 4203.57 0
0.4 886.79 179.79 661.43 112.11 938.46 0 4203.57 0
0.5 886.79 479.29 661.43 162.86 938.46 361.61 4203.57 0
0.6 886.79 513.33 661.43 215.49 938.46 337.5 4203.57 4.52
0.7 886.79 684.04 661.43 316.72 938.46 680.33 4203.57 12.14
AvaRamp: Available Ramping Reserve (MW/15min); ValRamp: Valuable Ramping Reserve (MW/15min);
AvaCap: Available Capacity Reserve (MW); ValCap: Valuable Capacity Reserve (MW);
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Fig. 4. Upward Ramping Reserve and Price for Unit 42 (r1 = 0.7, r2 = 1)
price is zero. It can be observed that the ramping reserve price
reaches its highest point at Time 5, which is also the peak load
interval. In contrast, the ramping reserve price is low at Time
6 although the load demand at Time 6 is still relatively high
compared to those at other intervals. It is observed the load
climbs from Time 4 to Time 5, but falls from Time 5 to Time
6 as shown in Fig. 2. It indicates that the ramping reserve
price is not only related with the load demand but also with
the load change. In this case, the upward ramping reserve is
scarce resource at Time 5, and the opportunity cost of keeping
them is also high. In contrast, the upward ramping reserve is
relatively cheap when the load demand is falling at Time 6,
7, and 8.
Fig. 5 depicts the available capacity reserve and the price of
capacity reserve for unit 24 with r1 = 0.7, r2 = 1. Although
the reserve amount unit 24 keeps is the same at each time
interval, the price is different. It is observed that the capacity
reserve price in this case has a similar trend to the system
load level shown in Fig. 2. For example, the capacity reserve
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Different r2 (r1 = 0.6)
is the most expensive at Time 5 when the peak load occurs.
The reason is that the system-wide upward capacity reserve
is the online installed capacity, which is fixed, less the load
level. When the load level is high, the upward capacity reserve
is small which becomes a scarce resource in the system.
Reserve credits with respect to different r2 are presented in
Fig. 6. It shows that the decrease of r2 (from 1 to 0.9 to 0.8)
also leads to lower payments related to reserve. For example,
when r2 decreases from 1 to 0.8, the total RC decreases from
around $2,300 to $1,000. The expected operation cost also
decreases from $194,000 to $192,000. It indicates that the
shrinking uncertainty set actually increases the feasible set for
the robust dispatches.
The numerical results in this part indicate that the reserve
payment proposed in this paper helps maximize the social war-
fare. When the uncertainty level is high, the payment related
to reserve is also high, It may attract long-term investment
of flexible resources. More flexible resources also mean the
system has more capabilities to handle the uncertainties, and
the system can accommodate higher RES penetrations.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a new concept, ramping reserve, within
the AARO SCED framework. AARO SCED is an effective tool
in RTM to address the uncertainty issue although its solution
may only be near-optimal. The flexibilities in this paper
include the generation ramping reserve and the generation
capacity reserve. The prices for the ramping reserve and
capacity reserve are also derived based on the Lagrangian
function. They are the opportunity costs of the uncertainty
mitigators to keep the reserves or flexibilities. With the help
of these prices, the reserves are classified into two categories,
which are available reserves and valuable reserves. The case
studies explain the concept of these reserves and the impacts
on the behaviors of market participants.
Many researches on this topic are open in the future.
With increasing RES penetration in the power system, the
flexibilities play a crucial role in uncertainty accommodation.
The prices derived in this paper provide an option on how
to provide the reserve signals within the robust optimization
framework. Those reserve credits to UMs may attract the
investment of flexible resources in the long term. In return,
new flexibility investment allows the system to accommodate
higher RES level.
It should be pointed out that the reserve prices are unit-
specified. It is admitted that it is not perfect. It is ideal that
all the resources at the same bus have the same price. An
extension of the proposed reserve prices is to set the maximum
ramping and capacity reserve prices for the units located at a
node as the nodal price. In this way, the nodal reserve prices
are determined by the most expensive opportunity cost for the
reserve in the node. However, due to the affine policy and the
non-zero optimality of the AARO SCED, it may deteriorate
the partial market equilibrium to a certain extent.
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